In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but nonetheless fail to entail a corresponding belief. If either (...) of these approaches were successful, it would potentially be damaging for Williamson's theory of knowledge. I argue that recent arguments that exemplify these approaches are unconvincing. (shrink)

In this article I discuss two counterexamples (the New Evil Demon Problem and Norman‘s Clairvoyance) to reliabilism and a potential solution: dispositional reliabilism. The latter is a recent addition to the many already-existing varieties of reliabilism and faces some serious problems of its own. I argue here that these problems are surmountable. The resulting central argument of the article aims to demonstrate how viewing reliabilism as an intrinsic dispositional property solves many of the issues facing reliabilism to date.

The new evil demon problem amounts to a difficult challenge for the externalist about epistemic justification. Many solutions to the problem have been proffered in the almost 40 years since its first appearance in the literature. Among the more promising responses is indexical reliabilism, a combination of two versions of actual world reliabilism where “actual” denotes either the world of utterance or a rigidly determined actual world. This paper does three things. First, it attempts to clarify indexical reliabilism and how (...) it purports to solve the new evil demon problem. Second, it attempts to mitigate some of the prominent criticism that has been leveled against the theory. Third, it poses an explanatory challenge for the theory which remains even after all of the premises supporting indexical reliabilism are accepted. The conclusion is that indexical reliabilism is not tenable until a linguistic mechanism for the use of “actually reliable” has been offered that explains how the theory avoids collapsing into a two-concepts response to the new evil demon problem. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) must know key moral principles and have adequate psychosocial skills. This is, though, not enough. They must also have and hone “between-the-lines” skills that will change over time. This article discusses seven of these skills that CECs need before, during, and after consultations. They have in common the unusual primary goal of maximizing CECs’ ability to bond with the patients and families with whom they consult. A focus on relationships, rather than on ethical outcomes, may paradoxically (...) enhance the possibility of achieving an ethical outcome. (shrink)

Since some care providers give colleagues’ interests priority over patients’ and families’, they are at risk of imposing their bias on patients without knowing this. In this piece I discuss how the risk increases when care providers have greater discretion and how they can best avoid this risk. I discuss identifying these situations, assessing them, and then, based on what they have concluded, intervening and use their having inadequate resources, their seeing what patients want as futile, and their making decisions (...) regarding surrogate decision makers as paradigmatic examples. As “remedies,” I suggest that care providers share with patients their rationales, validate adaptive aspects of difficult behaviors, self-disclose, and sometimes even go beyond their usual clinical practices. (shrink)

Originally published between 1925 and 1997 the volumes in this set: Discuss the Impacts of Profitability, Business Cycles and the Capital Stock on Productivity; Evaluate various approaches to managing the uncertainty inherent in the future course of the interest rate cycle; Examine the combined effect of financial instability and industrial restructuring on postwar economic growth and recession in the US; Determine what statistical and other information is needed to formulate both the objects and the means of government economic policy; Ask (...) what theoretical tools should be used in order to clarify the issues of economic policy; Examine the sociological aspects of the business cycle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DEAD MAN WALKING: ON THE CINEMATIC TREATMENT OF LICENSED PUBLIC KILLING Edmund Arens University ofLucerne I regret that so many people do not understand, but I know that they have not watched the state imitate the violence they so abhor. (Sister Helen Prejean) ~T\eadMan Walking, thehighlyacclaimed second film directed by Tim -Z-^Robbins, seems appropriate for discussion in the symposium's context oíFilm andModernity: Violence, Sacrifice andReligion. This film on (...) the one hand thematizes different forms ofviolence and victimization; on the other hand it presents divergent forms ofreligion. And it does so in a way which not only demonstrates the interplay of violence and religion but also opens up the chance of transcending various kinds of sacrificial structures inhabiting that interplay. We can approach DeadMan Walking in five steps. After some general remarks about this film as a work of art, I will briefly review the story line. In the part called Themes and Topics, I will outline some of the predominant topics addressed in this movie. The fourth step is devoted to the interrelation of Violence, Victimization and Redemption. Finally, the religious or theological question comes into view under the heading of Proximity and Testimony, an aspect which at the same time has a definite link to law and the legal system. I. DeadMan Walking as a Work of Art According to Susan Sontag, film "currently is the most vivid, the most stimulating, and the most important of all genres of art" (Sontag 13). But Edmund Arens15 whether a particular film really can be considered as a work of art depends on a number of presuppositions, a few of which I shall mention here. Without going too deeply into the debate on the nature and purpose of aesthetic production, there are at least some requirements which point to a work ofart. Roughly speaking, it is defined by putting matter and form into a certain relation, by creating or producing a certain structure, by adopting a certain style and by organizing the material by means ofgenres (all ofwhich relates to the classical notion of poesis). Secondly, a work of art deals with perception in a double way: while it implies a certain perception ofreality, it also invites the audience to participate in this perception and thus to deepen, alter, or correct the perception that they experienced (something which relates to aisthesis). Thirdly, art aims at having certain emotional effects on the public that are either purifying or edifying (something which since Aristotle has been discussed as katharsis). Ifthese three dimensions (cf. Jauss; Siller) are always involved in works ofart, we can ask how in DeadMan Walking the interplay ofpoesis, aisthesis, and katharsis is at work. Under certain conditions a film is a creative work ofart. In this case, the motion picture, whether documentary or fictitious, includes an aesthetic creation of an imagined reality. It does not simply mirror reality but always reconstructs or reshapes it. In fictional film narrative, everyday reality is disrupted and rearranged by means of a variety of formal and material techniques. The treatment of reality necessarily involves the question of representation. What Paul Ricoeur considered as decisive for narrative fiction, applies to narrative fiction films as well: they make use of "calculated dissonance" which disrupts everyday reality and thereby points to a "redescription ofreality" (Ricoeur 1975; 1976; 1986). We shall see later on how this process, attributed especially to certain metaphors, works in the case ofDeadMan Walking. Besides the topic ofrepresentation, any kind of art raises the question of perception. Art implies a certain perception and at the same time it offers or invites—in the case of visual art—the audience to perceive reality in a different or deeper manner. In amovie the audience, whether by a manipulative "aesthetics of overwhelming"1 or by an aesthetics of disclosing, is moved emotionally and imaginatively, the aim being to direct their attention to the secret ofthe things shown and thus to direct or redirect their view ofreality. From the point of view of a pragmatic theory of action (cf. Arens 1994; 1997b) which additionally takes up Ricoeur's most important insights, I would 'The term has been coined by Heiner Müller; quoted from Kirsner... (shrink)

This piece discusses ways in which clinicians may go beyond their usual practices. These include exploring the limits of old laws, consulting with colleagues and ethics committees earlier and more often, and giving patients’ family members new choices they didn’t have previously. This could include asking patients and family members whether clinicians should prioritize staying in the single, unconflicted role of serving patients and families, even when this might preclude simultaneously serving another interest, for example, that of a hospital.

Online tools are increasingly being used by students to cheat. File-sharing and homework-helper websites offer to aid students in their studies, but are vulnerable to misuse, and are increasingly reported as a major source of academic misconduct. Chegg.com is the largest such website. Despite this, there is little public information about the use of Chegg as a cheating tool. This is a critical omission, as for institutions to effectively tackle this threat, they must have a sophisticated understanding of their use. (...) To address this gap, this work reports on a comprehensive audit of Chegg usage conducted within an Australian university engineering school. We provide a detailed analysis of the growth of Chegg, its use within an Australian university engineering school, and the wait time to receive solutions. Alarmingly, we found over half of audit units had cheating content on Chegg is broadly used to cheat and 50% of questions asked on Chegg are answered within 1.5 h. This makes Chegg an appealing tool for academic misconduct in both assignment tasks and online exams. We further investigate the growth of Chegg and show its use is above pre-pandemic levels. This work provides valuable insights to educators and institutions looking to improve the integrity of their courses through assessment and policy development. Finally, to better understand and tackle this form of misconduct, we call on education institutions to be more transparent in reporting misconduct data and for homework-helper websites to improve defences against misuse. (shrink)

This article discusses a case in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics by McCrary and colleagues, “Elective Delivery Before 39 Weeks’ Gestation Reconciling Maternal, Fetal, and Family Circumstances,” in which parents asked the medical team to deliver their fetus “early.” The author discusses (1) the importance that parents have to a child when they are able to love the child, and how important it is for decision makers to consider this; (2) exceptional approaches that may enable parents to (...) “change their minds”; and (3) substantive and procedural innovations that may help to prevent clinicians’ views from playing too big a role and/or being arbitrary. The author concludes by describing how he felt when reading the case and uses this to illustrate how clinicians may benefit by assessing their feelings. (shrink)

Stress can make the comprehension of complex information more difficult, yet patients and their family members often must receive, process, and make decisions based on new, complex information presented in unfamiliar and stressful clinical environments such as the intensive care unit. Families may be asked to make decisions regarding the donation of organs and genetic tissue soon after the death of a loved one, based on new, complex information, under tight time limits. How can we assist patients and families to (...) better process complex information while under stress, and make better decisions for themselves or a loved one? (shrink)

Instead of the question, ‘do we have an obligation to obey the law?,’ we should first ask the more modest question, ‘do we have reasons to obey the law?’ This paper offers a new account of the notion of the content-independence of legal reasons in terms of the grounding relation. That account is then used to mount a defense of the claim that we do indeed have content-independent moral reasons to obey the law (because it is the law), and that (...) these reasons, very plausibly, often amount to an obligation to so act. (shrink)

Ethical questions regarding access to and use of electronically generated data are (if asked) commonly resolved by distinguishing in Lockean fashion between raw (unworked) and refined (worked) data. The former is thought to belong to no one, the latter to the collector and those to whom the collector grants access. Comparative power separates free riders from rightful owners. The resulting two-tiered ethics of access is here challenged on the grounds that it inequitably establishes a rule of law for the strong (...) while leaving the weak in a Hobbesian state of nature. Efforts at legislative constraints are reviewed; but such constraints are found to afford inadequate protections of privacy if a data subject may not prohibit others under ordinary circumstances from using recognizably name-linked data. (shrink)

In baseball, plate umpires are asked to make difficult perceptual judgments on a consistent basis. This chapter addresses some neuro-psychological issues faced by umpires as they call balls and strikes, and whether it is ethical to ask fallible humans to referee sporting events when faced with technology that exposes “blown” calls.

Edmund Burke: Modernity, Politics, and Aesthetics examines the philosophy of Burke in view of its contribution to our understanding of modernity. Burke's relevance, until recently, has lain in how his critique of the French Revolution bolstered arguments against revolutionary communism. As that threat recedes, should we allow Burke's significance to recede as well? Stephen K. White argues that Burke remains important because he shows us how modernity engenders an implicit forgetfulness of human finitude. White illustrates this theme by showing (...) how Burke's political thought, his judgment of the 'modern system of morality and policy,' and its taste for a 'false sublime' are structured by his aesthetics. In the late 20th century, an undemocratic thinker such as Burke may not have answers to our problems, but we might do well to let him deepen the questions that we ask. (shrink)

Few thinkers have provoked such violently opposing reactions as Edmund Burke. A giant of eighteenth-century political and intellectual life, Burke has been praised as a prophet who spied the terror latent in revolutionary or democratic ideologies, and condemned as defender of social hierarchy and outmoded political institutions. Ross Carroll tempers these judgments by situating Burke’s arguments in relation to the political controversies of his day. Burke’s writings must be understood as rhetorically brilliant exercises in political persuasion aimed less at (...) defending abstract truths than at warning his contemporaries about the corrosive forces – ideological, social, and political – that threatened their society. Drawing on Burke’s enormous corpus, Carroll presents a nuanced portrait of Burke as, above all, a diagnostician of political misrule, whether domestic, foreign, or imperial. Burke’s lasting value, Carroll argues, derives less from the content of his specific positions than from the difficult questions he forces us to ask of ourselves. This engaging and illuminating account of Burke’s work is a vital reference for students and scholars of history, philosophy, and political thought. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In an unpublished anatomical treatise written around 1670, the English anatomist and fellow of the Royal Society of London Edmund King proposed that the human body was ultimately an assemblage of tubes and contained liquids. Without literally seeing every of its constituents to be tubular, how did King come to posit a tubular body? This article tackles the question by examining King’s inquiry about the pulse against his framing of the circulatory system into a universally tubular model. Asking (...) how King registered this model despite the limited visibility of vascularity in practice, I discuss the place of analogy in his anatomical observation. I argue that analogy constituted an essential strategy for extending what King had perceived to account for the hardly perceptible nuances of the human body. I concentrate on two of his analogies, in which the artery was compared to the cord and the ureter. These two analogies revealed remarkable epistemic potency in representing and reasoning the pulse as the inherent motion of the living artery. They suggest that in seventeenth-century observation accounts, analogy was not simply a rhetoric suspicious of violating the principle of scientific empiricism; rather, they opened up ways of seeing and imagining nature. (shrink)

Edmund Pellegrino has pioneered work in medical ethics calling for a reconstruction of Hippocratic ethics. In particular, he has spoken of incorporating principles that concern justice and the common good. This article traces his commitment to the common good, concern for the poor, opposition to libertarianism, acknowledgement of the necessity of rationing, and reluctance to give clinicians social allocational tasks. It asks how Pellegrino relates distributive justice to the common good. Drawing on his theory relating autonomy to patient-centered beneficence (...) (in which autonomy is one element of the good rather than a side constraint on the good), the author argues that Pellegrino appears to make justice one element of the common good rather than a distributional moral constraint on promoting the good. He suggests that Pellegrino stands in three consequentialist or teleological moral traditions: professional physician ethics, Aristotelianism, and Catholic moral theology, but that there are the makings of a more independent, more egalitarian theory of justice in his writings. Keywords: autonomy, common good, consequentialism, Edmund Pellegrino, justice CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

War and Nature is an important, cogent, and timely book about the double‐edged nature of technology. Edmund Russell, through meticulous research, establishes a key nexus between the increased use of chemicals in war and peace during several key decades of the twentieth century and the generalized backlash against technology and its unintended consequences that occurred beginning in the mid‐1960s. He clearly places pesticides, rodenticides, herbicides, and chemical warfare agents alongside atomic energy, electronics, massive water harnessing and diversion projects, and (...) other prime examples of America's romance with progress. Thus, he joins his work with a significant body of research examining the United States's headlong plunge to embrace technology, along with sometimes belated efforts to grapple with its effects.The idea of progress has always been a distinctive factor in American identity. However, the fascination with progress was perhaps never so intense, so unreserved, and so naive as in the fifty years from 1914 to the early 1960s. During these years, as Russell points out, the pace of change was accelerated by two world wars that spawned the growth of powerful government agencies as well as commercial companies whose new products benefited richly from government‐funded research. Wartime imperatives hastened development of “miracle chemicals” that preserved the health of American soldiers, as when DDT was widely employed in the Pacific theater of war to kill malaria‐bearing mosquitoes. The result was what President Dwight D. Eisenhower, as he left office, termed the “military‐industrial complex.”Russell uses well‐chosen examples from the archives of chemical manufacturers to illustrate how defense contractors supplying electronics, atomic expertise, and other forms of technological expertise useful in warfare softened their public images by touting beneficent peacetime applications of their products. “Better Living Through Chemistry” along with “Progress Is Our Most Important Product” and other slogans familiar to citizens of the 1950s appealed not just to America's love of convenience and gadgetry. They also appealed to a fundamental U.S. belief that “modern science” would solve age‐old problems, erase perennial blights, and free people to live on a higher plane than any previously experienced by humankind.However, because defoliants, flame‐throwers, poison gases, and other chemical weapons that aided the war effort almost always conjured up negative images in the public mind, manufacturers used analogies of “victory” in war to victory over man's environment to retain a reputable and lucrative place in peacetime society.Perhaps most striking are the parallels between chemicals and atomic energy during the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s in the United States. Both chemicals and atomic energy proved their awesome power in hastening victory in World War II, and both needed softer images after the war ended. The promises of disease‐free fields and enormously increased crop yields appealed to the American public, just as did the hope of electricity “too cheap to meter” and nuclear medicine that might cure cancers.When chemicals began to poison birds, fish, and other species recognized as valuable and desirable to man, when fields lost their productivity, and when illnesses arose in certain occupations that could be linked to chemical exposure, the downsides of progress became evident. America recoiled and reevaluated. Russell weaves congressional testimony together with advertisements, popular cartoons, and other ephemera to bring to life this uniquely American story. He compels the reader to ask striking questions about a nation maturing and itself asking complex questions about one of its most cherished ideals.The final irony of Russell's book may lie in the fact that it was written before the World Trade Center attack on 11 September 2001 but published just afterward, in the midst of America's anthrax episodes in the fall of the same year. The world focus on chemical and biological warfare should now provide a whole set of additional readers for this valuable book. (shrink)

ALTHOUGH THERE is no direct dependence of Bernard Lonergan upon Edmund HusserI in the manner, say, of Husserl himself upon Franz Brentano, there are nonetheless points of similarity and contrast between them. It would be possible to list these matching points singly on their own, such as Epoche and self-appropriation, Erlebnis and consciousness, monad and subject, Anschauung and affirmation. However, besides and beneath these individual points of similarity and contrast, lying as their basis, there is similarity and contrast at (...) the level of the fundamental conceptions of the two philosophers. Husserl and Lonergan share a common problematic: the structure of intentionality. If intentionality is the common problematic where Husserl and Lonergan meet, one might ask if and how various notions of theirs viewed in relation to intentionality are common or divergent. For the sake of comparison-confrontation, one might take the two central notions, Anschauung (intuition) in Husserl and affirmation in Lonergan, and inspect some of the implications they have for the two philosophers. Husserl calls intuition the "principle of all principles for his phenomenology." For his part, Lonergan conceives of affirmation as the culmination of the knowing process. Intuition and affirmation have analogous roles. For Husserl it is through intuition that cognition attains what is real, whereas for Lonergan it is through affirmation. The comparison-confrontation between Husserl and Lonergan can be summed up in terms of the three questions that Lonergan sets up to mark off the range of human knowing. First, what happens when one knows? Secondly, why is doing that knowing? Thirdly, what does one know when he does it? Husserl and Lonergan would seem closest in their approach to answering question one. However, they would part company in their answers to questions two and three, for here intuition and affirmation essentially determine what kind of an answer can be given. This paper will work within the brackets of these three questions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Edited by EDMUND SANTURRI AND WILLIAM WERPE· HOWSKI. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp. xxii + 307. $35.00 (paper). The essays in this volume address numerous philosophic and theological issues surrounding the two commandments of love of God and love of neighbor. A brief review cannot do justice to the careful argumentatation contained in the (...) essays. Forced to make an unhappy choice, I have decided to provide some sense of the main line of argument in each piece and to add a few general comments about the dominant approaches to Christian charity in the volume. Gene Outka's "Universal Love and Impartiality," which sets the stage for many of the other pieces, asks: Should there be " no disparity between our consideration of others and our consideration of ourselves? " (3). On the basis of a sustained comparison of Christian universal love with impartiality, Outka concludes that, " while universal love allies itself with impartiality at certain junctures, it represents an advance over impartiality because it more readily accommodates differences between neighbor-love and self-love" (79-80). Christianity's normative emphasis on regard for others goes beyond impartiality toward altruism. Christian ethics is not, however, identical with altruism if the latter means that the " self does not matter." This would be contrary to the theocentric framework of the commandments, which refer directly to the "self's well-being" (82). In contrast to both impartiality and altruism, universal love accents " inclusiveness " over " comparative measurement." On a descriptive level, impartialists " fall to take seriously enough the power of self-preoccupation." The simple assertions of equal regard do not meet the need for ameliorative strategies to correct our tendencies toward selfishness and pride. There are other disparities between self- and neighbor-love and thus between universal love and impartiality. In contrast to impartiality, universal love includes "legitimate, normative self-regarding considerations." This provides a response to the criticism that Christian love involves selfannihilation. A complete passivity to others can result in a loss of a determinate sense of self; but, as Outka argues, such passivity is not 313 314 BOOK REVIEWS to be confused with Christian humility. Rather, it can be rooted in the sin of sloth, disguised as humility. The theocentric concern with the self avoids both pride and sloth through obedient willing. Finally, there are legitimate and ineradicable self-regarding considerations at the descriptive level: I cannot "promote and protect" the well-being of neighbor and self in " exactly the same way" (87). In "Who is My Neighbor? Love, Equality, and Profoundly Retarded Humans,'' Edmund Santurri contrasts the humanist and inclusive view of equal worth with the rationalist view, which identifies being a person with having a rational capacity to desire, choose, evaluate, and so forth. As a way of clarifying the Christian-humanist view, Santurri considers various interpretations of the scriptural language concerning man as an image of God. He argues that in the biblical narrative all beings born of humankind are created in God's image. He then addresses two rival construals of personhood. The first limits personhood to those who have the capacity to value their existence, while the second accords equal standing to those who can participate in communal deliberation. Both views abstract from historical and social con· nections embedded in species life (124). The argument for inclusion of the severely retarded rests not on reductionist biological principles, hut upon social phenomena: " the retarded are born of us, look like us, and interact with us in a wide assortment of highly distinctive social settings " (126). In "'Agape' and Special Relations," William Werpehowski begins by engaging Gewirth's attempt to justify ethical particularism on the basis of ethical universalism. While his view is not as susceptible to criticism as some have thought, Werpehowski is nonetheless sympathetic with the concerns of Amelie Rorty, who worries that a view like that of Gewirth " locates the focus of moral theory and moral action in the processes and rules for justification " which thus " underdescribe and underdetermine the detailed thoughtfulness required for appropriate action" (146-147). As a corrective, Werpehowski appeals to Christian moral discernment or prudence. In a number of... (shrink)

En este texto planteamos la pregunta por la inscripción de la sorpresa en la fenomenología de las emociones de Husserl. Pero antes de dar por supuesto que Husserl abordó el problema de la sorpresa, nos preguntamos si verdaderamente lo hizo y sí, incluso, se puede hablar de una "fenomenología de las emociones" en su obra. El texto está, así, motivado por dos interrogantes: ¿Es la sorpresa una emoción? ¿Husserl desarrolló verdaderamente una "fenomenología de las emociones"? Esto nos conducirá a 1) (...) plantear una redefinición de sorpresa y 2) avanzar por el camino de una fenomenología un poco reformada por el hecho de la sorpresa. En tres apartados desarrollamos este planteamiento: I. La fenomenología husserliana de las emociones, II. ¿La sorpresa es una emoción? Y III. La sorpresa, un proceso. In this paper we argue about the inscription of surprise in the phenomenology of emotions of E. Husserl. But before assuming that E. Husserl addressed the issue of surprise, we ask if he really did it and even, if it is possible to talk about a "phenomenology of emotions" his work. The paper is thus motivated by two questions: Is surprise an emotion? Did Husserl really develop a "phenomenology of emotions"? This will take us to, 1) outline a redefinition of surprise, and 2) advance through the path of a phenomenology that has been a bit reformed by the fact of surprise. This issue will be developed in three stages: I. the husserlian phenomenology of emotions, II. Is surprise an emotion? III. The surprise, a process. (shrink)

Because we are often nagged by the thought that we might not have behaved any differently than those good citizens whose respect for the law and fear of punishment led them to support the Nazi regime, we are fascinated with the behavior of ordinary Germans. Careful to first strip away the pathological explanations of German behavior, Pellegrino and Thomasma ask simply whether ordinary Germans could have reasoned and, by implication, acted differently. Although their affirmative answer is consistent with the activism (...) we have all come to demand of the Germans, it is not clear whether we, ourselves, can lay full claim to the moral high ground. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenological philosophy, developed the concept of the so-called pure transcendental consciousness. The author of the article asks whether the concept of consciousness understood this way can constitute a model for AI consciousness. It should be remembered that transcendental consciousness is the result of the use of the phenomenological method, the essence of which is referring to experience (“back to things themselves”). Therefore, one can legitimately ask whether the consciousness that AI can achieve can possess (...) the characteristics attributed by Husserl to pure transcendental consciousness. The answer to such questions seems to be negative because AI, as created by humans, can only operate in the field of phenomena. Human intelligence, however, is capable of operating at the ontological level. In the face of difficulties in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness on a scientific basis, the question arises about the possibility of using the phenomenological concept of consciousness developed by Husserl as a starting point in analyzes aimed at answering the question about AI consciousness (The aim of the article is not to discuss in detail the contemporary state of research on consciousness. Therefore, many results currently achieved mainly in the field of neuroscience are omitted. It is just about indicating the possible application of Husserl’s transcendental concept of consciousness in research on AI consciousness). (shrink)

The work begins by asking the questions of how contemporary phenomenology is concerned with music, and how phenomenological descriptions of music and musical experiences are helpful in grasping the concreteness of these experiences. I then proceed with minor findings from phenomenological authorities, who seem to somehow need music to explain their phenomenology. From Maurice Merleau-Ponty to Jean-Luc Nancy and back to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, there are musical findings to be asserted. I propose to look at phenomenological studies (...) of the musical aspects of existence as they appear in various philosophical works bringing together different accounts of music and aesthetics and pointing towards phenomenological study as a methodology for everyday aesthetics. While there are many different areas of music phenomenology such as studies of sound and listening, studies in perception of musical works, in experience of artistic creation, in singing and playing musical instruments, and phenomenology of transcendent or religious horizons of the experience of music, it is most promising—I suggest—to look at phenomenological studies of music from the perspective of everyday happenings and discoveries of musical aspects of life. Thus, I attempt to display the uses of phenomenology in finding musical aspects of everyday existence as well as in describing and illuminating the art of music. A look at Roman Ingarden’s and Mikel Dufrenne’s most intuitive and promising ideas will be broadened with a perspective from Don Ihde and Arnold Berleant. (shrink)

In 1987, Sir Edmund Leach, the most influential British social anthropologist of his generation, startled a conference in Norwich of the Association of Social Anthropologists by declaring that ethnographic monographs were essentially fictions, expressing the personality of the author. When asked what should be the goal of the anthropologist, he replied, ‘To write another War and Peace’. This and some similar papers were published by him and have come in for much criticism: for instance, from a leading anthropologist of (...) the next generation, Adam Kuper, who has regretted that Leach made such a concession to fashionable post-modernism, the ‘literary turn’ in anthropology, shortly before his death (Kuper, 1999: 15-35). (shrink)

Provides a true starting point for the study of the "phenomenological" movement of which Husserl is the founder.

This paper critically assesses Edmund Husserl's concept of the ‘life-world’, found in his Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. We argue that Husserl's phenomenology fails to consider the social and material arrangements that allow subjectivity to emerge in our shared world. We begin by outlining the concept as formulated in Husserl’s Crisis. We then entertain Husserl’s critique by his most famous student, Martin Heidegger. We suggest a reformulation of intersubjectivity, along the lines of Heidegger’s mitdasein, accounts for subjectivity (...) as it emerges in the shared world. Next, we introduce ethnomethodology, pioneered by Harold Garfinkel, which gives sociological support to this argument. Through the ethnomethodological disability studies of A.B. Robillard, we argue that the life-world is not always as democratic as Husserl's philosophy may suggest. This shows the necessity of disability politics. We end by asking what a phenomenology sensitive to this fact might look like, in terms of both disability studies and phenomenological philosophy more generally. (shrink)

Bringing together Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Jan Patocka, this book provides a comprehensive examination of the central role that questioning plays in phenomenology. Joel Hubick not only offers a phenomenological analysis of the activity of asking questions, but further traces the development of this form of questioning in the early stages of the phenomenology movement. Starting with Husserl's motto 'to the matters themselves', Hubick examines how the phenomenological method utilizes questioning as a means to both return to and (...) to preserve the phenomena in order to re-experience them anew. He then demonstrates how Heidegger takes up Husserl's phenomenology as presented in the Logical Investigations and, in doing so, develops phenomenology into a philosophy of possibility, one that seeks in equal measure to preserve questions while also answering them. Continuing this questioning philosophy, this volume showcases how Patocka explicitly advances what had remained implicit in both Husserl and Heidegger's works; namely, phenomenology understood as a set of questions - from 'what is history?' to 'who am I?' - all of which elicit original experiences for future generations of thinkers. With a close focus on the primary material of these three fundamental figures, The Phenomenology of Questioning affords a crucial insight into the history of phenomenological reasoning, as well as a reminder to today's phenomenologists to continue asking questions. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Edmund Husserl’s views on the differences between human and animal consciousness, with particular attention to the experience of temporality.In the first section, I situate the topic of animal consciousness in the broader context of Husserl’s philosophy. Whereas this connection has been often neglected, I argue that a phenomenological analysis of non-human subjectivities is not only justified, but also essential to the Husserlian project as a whole.In the second section, I introduce two (...) notions Husserl resorts to when describing the essential difference between human and animal subjectivities, namely “strata of consciousness” and “person.” Drawing on textual evidence, I argue that Husserl does not simply see animals as excluded from the sphere of personhood. Rather, he draws a distinction between two modes of personal life, one of which is said to be unique to human adults.What holds these two modes apart, according to Husserl, is a subject’s relation to time. In the third section, I delve deeper into this topic, asking how we should understand Husserl’s claim that animals live in a “restricted temporality.” I argue that this has less to do with an inability to remember, imagine, or anticipate future events, and more with an inability to explore temporal horizons stretching before one’s birth or after one’s death. By contrast, humans gradually overcome these limitations during ontogeny, thanks to the practice of linguistic communication. This also has consequences for our capacity to engage in genuinely theoretical thought. (shrink)

What kind of reality is legal reality, how is it created, and what are its a priori foundations? These are the central questions asked by the early phenomenologists who took interest in social ontology and law. While Reinach represents the well-known “realist” approach to phenomenology of law, Felix Kaufmann and Fritz Schreier belonged to the “positivist” “Vienna School of Jurisprudence,” combining Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology—and thereby challenging Reinach’s views on how legal reality and (...) the legal a priori were to be conceived. This paper addresses the controversy between these positivist and realist approaches to phenomenology of law, with the goal of introducing the lesser known theories of Kaufmann and Schreier. The special focus on their critique of Reinach’s outline should give us an overview of their positions vis-à-vis the basic and a priori elements of which legal reality consists and the role that phenomenology plays in analyzing them. There is one general tendency to be noted: While the phenomenological legal positivists see the root of legal reality in an act of interpretation according to a “normative scheme of interpretation,” Reinach locates the roots of legal reality in social interaction and argues for the existence of entities independent of any interpretation. (shrink)

Does addiction to heroin undermine the voluntariness of heroin addicts' consent to take part in research which involves giving them free and legal heroin? This question has been raised in connection with research into the effectiveness of heroin prescription as a way of treating dependent heroin users. Participants in such research are required to give their informed consent to take part. Louis C. Charland has argued that we should not presume that heroin addicts are competent to do this since heroin (...) addiction by nature involves a loss of ability to resist the desire for heroin. In this article, I argue that Charland is right that we should not presume that heroin addicts are competent to consent, but not for the reason he thinks. In fact, as Charland's critics correctly point out, there is plenty of evidence showing that heroin addicts can resist their desire for heroin. These critics are wrong, however, to conclude from this that we should presume that heroin addicts are competent to give their voluntary consent. There are, I shall argue, other conditions associated with heroin addiction that might constrain heroin addicts' choice in ways likely to undermine the voluntariness of their consent. In order to see this, we need to move beyond the focus on the addicts' desires for heroin and instead consider the wider social and psychological circumstances of heroin addiction, as well as the effects these circumstances may have on the addicts' beliefs about the nature of their options. (shrink)

stufe oder Unterstufe im emporsteigenden Gang zur absoluten Er kenntnis gewinnen. Man kann sagen, daB das philosophisehe Interesse in vollbe wuBter Weise als leitendes Ziel das vor Augen hat, was sieh in jedem 5 rein theoretisehen Interesse als gleiehsam verborgene Tendenz be kundet: Die Tendenz auf vollkommene Erkenntnis liegt in allem rein theoretisehen Bestreben. a) Immerfort ftihlt es sieh fortgetrieben im Sinne mOgliehster Verdeutliehung, Klarung, mogliehst vollkom mener Begriindung. b) Immerfort ftihlt es sieh mit der vereinzelten 10 Tatsaehe, mit dem (...) vereinzelten Gesetz unbefriedigt; es kann daran nieht haften bleiben. Es ftihlt sich gedrangt, von dem Besonderen emporzusteigen zum Allgemeineren, von der Tatsaehe zum Gesetz, von der niederen Allgemeinheit zu der hoheren. Damit nieht zufrie den, muB es aIle mogliehen theoretisehen Lehren durehlaufen, um- 15 spannende Theorien bauen, die Theorien zu umfassenden Theorien verbinden, und so immer weiter. Dabei erweitert sieh der enge Kreis der yom theoretisehen Interesse zunaehst ins Auge gefaBten Gegen standliehkeiten; Einheit der theoretisehen Erkenntnis greift immer weiter von Gebiet zu Gebiet, ohne Grenze. 20 Bringen wir uns diese Tendenzen zur Klarheit, so sehen wir, daB sie im Verborgenen dem Ziel der hoehsten Vereinheitliehung die nen, daB sie verstreuten, zusammenhangslosen Erkenntnissen feind sind, daB sie gleiehsam niehts Untheoretisehes, Unvereinheitlichtes dulden wollen ebensowenig als ein Ende, soweit irgend noeh ein plus 25 ultra denkbar ist. Und zu alledem gehort offenbar aueh die Tendenz zu voll ausweisender Klarheit. (shrink)

It is common to think of addiction as involving behavior which in some sense is ?out of control.? But does this mean addictive actions occur because of compulsion or because of ordinary weakness of will? Many philosophers argue that addictive actions occur because of weakness of will, since there is plenty of evidence suggesting that they are not caused by irresistible desires. In fact, addicts seem, in general, to perform these actions freely in the sense of having the ability to (...) refrain from doing so. In this paper I argue, first, that it is not the addiction-as-compulsion view that is mistaken, but rather the view that irresistible desires are a defining feature of compulsion. Second, drawing on some results in addiction neuroscience, I construct and defend a new analysis of compulsivity that distinguishes addictive from weak-willed actions in a way that is consistent with the view that addictive actions are performed freely. (shrink)

Hierbei beruhrt Husserl auch Themen, welche die Grenzen der Methode aufzeigen, z.B. die eidetische Variation meines eigenen Charakters.

This book takes Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and applies it to help psychotherapy practitioners formulate complex psychological problems. The reader will learn about Husserl's system of understanding and its concepts that point to first-person lived experience, and about the work of Husserl scholars who have developed a way to be precise about the experiences that clients have. Through exploring the connection between academic philosophy of consciousness and mental health, themes of biopsychosocial treatment planning, psychopathology of personality and psychological disorders, and (...) the treatment of complex psychological problems become clear. The author shows that Husserlian phenomenology can be used in the design of interventions for clients in a process called formulation. Once the intentionality of consciousness is understood, by asking simple questions, it becomes possible to define problematic experiences. This is a means of creating informed consent for treatment and it makes it clear to clients what is happening for them, so helping them understand themselves and how they see the world. We also see how Husserl's phenomenology is a vehicle for psychotherapists to present their knowledge about the research literature of what has been found to be effective care. This volume applies the concepts and practices of phenomenology in a concrete way, relating them to the practice of therapy and showing the value of a qualitative approach to understanding mental processes and the nature of human beings as motivated by values, meanings and other conscious experiences. This is a readable text in simple language that condenses key aspects of Husserl's thinking in relation to the theory and practice of psychotherapy, and it is suitable for philosophers and practitioners of psychology, psychiatry, and the psychotherapies, including psychoanalysis. (shrink)

Many scholars and activists favor banning illicit businesses, especially given that such businesses constitute a large part of the global economy. But these businesses are commonly operated as if they are subject only to the ethical norms their management chooses to recognize, and as a result they sometimes harm innocent people. This can happen in part because there are no effective legal constraints on illicit businesses, and in part because it seems theoretically impossible to dispose definitively of arguments that support (...) moral relativism. Progress is being made, however, towards a “second best” arrangement consisting of widespread institutional agreements regarding ethical norms. This development might eventually enable us to transcend moral relativism in some respects. Indeed, although some business ethicists who examine illicit business practices accept moral relativism, others attempt to surmount it. The latters’ endeavor, I show, is cross-cultural in nature in that it involves businesses that are deemed illicit in at least one but not every culture. I then recall some traditional solutions and their limits: ideological teachings are culture-specific, hence both temporally and spatially limited; legal constraints, though potentially helpful, are too diverse hence often narrow in reach. Especially problematic are defense industry businesses, which are inherently transcultural and, though uniquely harmful, are not effectively banned in any culture. Harm to quality of life (QoL) can, however, be measured. So I recommend institutional support for international human rights tied to QoL data as a workable way to counter moral relativism regarding illicit businesses. (shrink)

Business ethicists should examine ethical issues that impinge on the perimeters of their specialized studies (Byrne 2011 ). This article addresses one peripheral issue that cries out for such consideration: the international resource privilege (IRP). After explaining briefly what the IRP involves I argue that it is unethical and should not be supported in international law. My argument is based on others’ findings as to the consequences of current IRP transactions and of their ethically indefensible historical precedents. In particular I (...) examine arguments from political philosophy for more equitable distribution of resources and appeals to property rights as a means of achieving this; business ethicists’ critiques of contemporary resource appropriations; and legal historians’ accounts of despoliation of aboriginal peoples, especially in what is now the United States, involving acquisition via conquest, asserted jurisdiction, and religious and racial preeminence. I also consider relevant human rights’ standards; supportive views of some theorists, especially early modern realists and current supporters of group rights and multidimensional rectification; some de facto incidences of substantive restitution; and proposals for effecting further rectification. (shrink)

Famously, in 1790, Edmund Burke asked who of the most recent generation had ever read a work of the most prominent freethinkers of the earlier eighteenth century (naming Anthony Collins, John Tolan...

This is a review and discussion of Ask Vest Christiansen’s book Gym Culture, Identity and Performance-Enhancing Drugs: Tracing a Typology of Steroid Use. As indicated by the title, the book...